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Abstract: This paper examines the distribution of lifetime income in Ireland. To do this a new
prototype dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland is used to generate lifetime income streams.
Aggregating over the lifetime we can assess the distribution of lifetime income and the degree of
redistribution in the tax-benefit system. In addition to the effect of taxes and benefits, we




he distribution of current income and the redistributive effect of the tax-
benefit system at a point in time have been extensively studied in Ireland.
Typically, the accounting period, the period over which the redistribution is
measured, has been relatively short (i.e. redistribution over a week or a year).
191
Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Irish Economic Association.
* The author gratefully acknowledges financial assistance from the Postgraduate Fellowship of
The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. The paper uses data from the 1994 Living
in Ireland Survey, made available by The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. The
paper was mainly written while a member of staff of the Department of Applied Economics,
University of Cambridge. I am grateful to my supervisor Jane Falkingham for detailed comments
on my work, to my colleagues Herwig Immervoll, Jamie Coventry and Paul Kattuman for their
advice, and to comments from seminar participants at the Athens University of Business and
Economics, the University of Bologna, the University of Cambridge, Irish Economic Association
Conference Portumna, the London School of Economics and the National University of Ireland,
Galway. I am also very grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee. The author is
responsible for all remaining errors.
1. O’Donoghue article • art  2/4/02  9:06 am  Page 191Examples include Callan and Nolan (1990, 1999). In this paper, we measure
redistribution in the Irish tax-benefit system using a lifetime accounting
period. The purpose of this paper is twofold. In addition to analysing the
degree of redistribution over the lifetime, the paper also describes a new
analytical tool designed for analysing public policy in Ireland, a dynamic
microsimulation model.
The primary reasons for studying lifetime income is that income measures
that cover short periods depend too much on chance. Layard (1977) argues that
using short accounting periods exaggerates the basic inequality of incomes
and the amount of redistribution. Short accounting periods will tend to
increase the degree of income inequality measured within a population
because of the nature of short-term income volatility, life-cycle effects and
different career trajectories. For example, an individual, who becomes short-
term unemployed from high paid employment, will be classified as poor during
the period of unemployment. However over their lifetime, they may be
classified as rich. Turning to life-cycle effects, pensioners will tend to be lower
down the income distribution, but yet during their working lives, may have
been higher up the distribution. Nelissen (1998) has highlighted the
importance of career trajectories on lifetime income. Individuals who invest
more in education may have lower income than those with lower education
attainments earlier in their lifetimes and so be lower in the annual income
distribution. However, they will tend to have higher income trajectories over
their careers and as a result they will eventually pass out the lower educated
in the income distribution and spend more years higher up the annual income
distribution. 
Empirically, panel studies have shown that there is considerable income
mobility over time. For example Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) found that in
Britain only 37 per cent of the poorest decile group were still in the bottom
decile after four years. Björklund and Palme (1997) found in a study of dispos-
able incomes 1974-1991 in Sweden, that lifetime income dispersion was 30-60
per cent of that of total income for the population over the period. Nelissen
(1998) argues that the percentage of transitory income over the lifetime had
increased over time due to greater career mobility. Lifetime income more fully
explains an individual’s long-term potential standard of living. However, it
must be noted that shorter accounting periods may be more appropriate as a
measure of welfare when short-term concerns are more important especially
when considering the very poor who may be credit constrained.
Income related policy instruments such as means tested benefits, social
insurance contributions and income taxes tend to use short accounting periods
(i.e. of a year or less). As a result, during poor periods of the life-cycle,
individuals will tend to be net beneficiaries from redistributive polices and net
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short accounting periods, found that taxes and benefits had a significant
redistributive effect that became more important over time. However, over the
lifetime, the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits may be less strong. Most
pensioners receive contributory benefits where benefit receipt represents a
return on contributions made during the lifetime rather than as a pure
distribution from rich to poor. Seniority rules will result in those with more
experience earning more and so, because of the progressive nature of the
income tax system, they will tend to pay a higher average tax rate during
periods of their lifetime when in receipt of higher earnings. 
In this paper we focus on redistribution in the Irish tax-benefit system.
The system is in many respects typical of the Anglo-Liberal style of welfare
state, with relatively insignificant social insurance systems, where means
testing and progressive income taxes are relatively more important than in
other countries. There are a number of important differences between the UK
and Irish tax-benefit systems. First, means testing tends to be more import-
ant. Unlike public pensions in the UK, the Irish system generally has no
earnings related components, with flat rate benefits being the norm. Having a
larger self-employed population, the coverage of social insurance also tends to
be lower. Structurally, means tested benefits are designed differently to the
UK. Although Ireland uses a set of categorical instruments for different con-
tingencies, with different means tests and eligibility conditions, they together
however cover the same set of contingencies as the single universal means
tested benefit, income support in the UK.1 This reflects the incremental
expansion in coverage of social benefits since the foundation of the state,
largely having no sweeping reforms as in the case of the Beveridge and Fowler
reforms in the UK. Housing Benefits are less important, but however are now
growing in importance due to the recent growth in housing costs. Income taxes
differ from the UK in that couples can optionally have their income taxed
jointly.2
This paper is designed as follows. Section II describes briefly the principle
methodology used in this paper, dynamic microsimulation. Section III
discusses some measurement issues. The results are presented in Section IV.
First, some initial results of the lifetime incidence of the tax-benefit system.
We  then investigate the distribution of lifetime income in Ireland. We also
compare the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system over the lifetime
with that over a shorter accounting period, the year. The characteristics that
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A number of studies have examined lifetime redistribution in tax-benefit
systems. One method used has been to take stylised individuals/households
and to simulate given their life histories, the life-course impact of tax-benefits.
Examples include “money’s worth” studies in the USA, which look at the
return to state pension contributions over the lifetime. Hughes (1985)
calculated rates of return in the Irish public pension system using stylised
individuals, while Evans and Falkingham (1997) look at the ability of different
national pension systems to provide minimum incomes in retirement for a
range of different stylised life histories.
Although useful for illustration purposes, utilising stylised households
and individuals however, has a number of drawbacks. Even if a wide range of
stylised individuals are used, these typically only represent a small proportion
of the heterogeneity of a population. In moving from a static single year
analysis to life-course patterns, heterogeneity will increase as there are more
variable factors and hence, stylised households will be even less repre-
sentative. In order to consider life-course influences on tax-benefit systems
incorporating the heterogeneity represented in the population, micro panel
data is necessary. It is rare however that data exists with such a long-time
horizon. Even long running household panel datasets such as the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics in the USA and the German Socio-Economic Panel have
only 20-30 years of information. A notable exception is Björklund (1993) who
used a dataset containing thirty-nine years of Swedish income data taken
from register information to look at lifetime versus annual income
distribution. In the absence of long running panel data, other methods have to
be considered. For example, Attanasio and Banks (1998) have pooled multiple
cross-sectional datasets to form pseudo-cohort to look at household savings
behaviour over the life-cycle. 
Another method, known as dynamic microsimulation, is to synthetically
simulate panel data and involves simulating over a lifetime or period of time,
components that influence the lifetime distribution of income such as
mortality, earnings patterns, retirement decisions etc. This field has existed
for over thirty years (See Orcutt et al., 1961), but however, initially, the
perceived benefits did not outweigh the very high costs of development and as
a result dynamic microsimulation models were only built in a very small
number of countries (USA and Germany). However, over the last ten years the
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micro-data increased. So far about 30 dynamic microsimulation models have
been constructed internationally (See O’Donoghue (2001) for a survey), with
approximately 10 models in active use at present.
Microsimulation models incorporate behaviour in a less comprehensive
manner, than other models such as overlapping generations models (OGM)
that have production sectors and models of sectoral interactions. OGM’s too
can examine similar inter-temporal public finance issues as dynamic
microsimulation models and furthermore can take into consideration, general
equilibrium effects of public policy. However, OGM’s lack the detail of
microsimulation models and so are less able to incorporate the rules of tax-
benefit systems. 
The limited behavioural processes included in dynamic microsimulation
models depend strongly on the micro-behavioural econometric studies and
household datasets on which they are based. At present there exist many
knowledge gaps about the micro-economic behaviour of individuals and
families both internationally and in Ireland. Internationally, the Panel on
Retirement Income Modelling (Citro and Hanushek, 1997) in the USA
highlights for example, that the life-cycle model of savings and consumption
does not adequately explain long-run changes in personal savings behaviour.
Also life-course labour supply and retirement behaviour is not well
understood. In Ireland many gaps exist such as the economic determinants of
demographic behaviour, empirical models of savings and wealth accumulation
behaviour or earnings mobility.
The absence of good datasets also limits the development of the field. In
most countries of Europe at present, only 4 waves of the European Community
Household Panel are available, limiting the quantification of dynamic
behaviour. Such short panel datasets will also be less able to disentangle the
impact of age, cohort and period effects. Witness the difference in the age
earnings relationship when estimated on cross-section or panel data. In the
former case, the relationship exhibits an inverted U, while actual cohort
specific age, earnings relationships tend to rise over the entire lifetime. 
Given these limitations it might be argued that one should wait until these
deficiencies are corrected before embarking on such an ambitious project as
creating a microsimulation model. However, as Burtless (1996) points out
microsimulation provides an organising framework. In other words, the
existence of a dynamic microsimulation model forces model developers to
think about the interactions between behavioural processes rather than
focusing purely on specific issues or single dimensions of multi-dimensional
decisions. In this way they help to identify knowledge and data gaps and help
to create an agenda for filling them.
REDISTRIBUTION IN THE IRISH TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 195
1. O’Donoghue article • art  2/4/02  9:06 am  Page 195Dynamic microsimulation models can be divided into two types,
population and cohort models (see Harding, 1993). Both types of model
simulate for individual agents, life histories of processes such as education,
fertility, marriage, labour market behaviour and detailed government policies.
There is a computational trade-off between simulating many cohorts and
simulating many years. Historically, dynamic population models opted to
simulate many cohorts over the medium term of say 20-40 years. Dynamic
cohort models on the other hand opted to simulate single cohorts over an
entire lifetime. However, recently, as computational costs have come down,
this is less of an issue. 
The two models also have been used to examine different issues. Dynamic
population models project forward the characteristics of a population cross-
section over a number of years into the future. They take a set of underlying
assumptions about the way behaviour will change over time. As a result they
produce a forecast of the population at some point in the future and so in ways
they are analogous to the forecasts by medium and long-term macro models.
Projecting information necessary to simulate long-term policy issues such as
pensions and long-term care, they can be used to examine the effect of
demographic and economic changes on existing policy and also to design
alternative policy instruments (See Caldwell et al., 1999). 
Dynamic cohort models on the other hand, tend to make steady state
assumptions, assuming that behaviour is unchanging over time, for example
behaviour as observed in the mid-1990s. They then typically take a single tax-
benefit system and carry out analysis on it in a steady state. (See Harding,
1993; Falkingham and Hills, 1995 and Baldini, 1997.) They therefore
represent no cohort. Focusing on just one system and utilising unchanging
behaviour patterns they allow one to look at the actual forces within a
particular tax-benefit system that drive lifetime redistribution results without
considering potential compensating interactions.
Model Description
The model used in this paper is described in more detail in O’Donoghue
(2001) and can be characterised as a dynamic steady state cohort model.3 The
objective of this paper is to measure the degree of redistribution over the
lifetime of the Irish Tax-Benefit system. Because a synthetic panel is
generated, all aspects of life-cycle behaviour that influence the tax-benefit
systems needs to be simulated.4 Labour market behaviour equations are
196 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
3 It must however be noted that the software has been designed with the broader ambition of
constructing a dynamic population microsimulation model capable of simulating multiple cohorts.
4 Because there are a number of hundred behavioural equations, we do not report these results
here. (See O’Donoghue, 2001).
1. O’Donoghue article • art  2/4/02  9:06 am  Page 196estimated using the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, a 4,000 household income
survey, part of the European Community Panel Survey, described in Callan et
al. (1996). Transitions were estimated using recall data from 1993 and current
information from 1994. In the future, access to further waves of the panel will
improve the model estimates. Most demographic processes such as mortality,
fertility and education are estimated using official statistics. 
In order to generate the correct life-cycle distribution of age and births, the
main demographic processes, education, fertility, disability, marriage and
mortality are simulated. While these characteristics depend primarily on age,
marital status and gender, own and parental occupation and education levels
are also important determinants. Because of the recent volatility in migration
flows we assume no migration in the current model. Marriage is simulated by
first selecting individuals in the model to marry and then by utilising a
matching algorithm, potential partners are selected from the population.
The labour market process is hierarchical. First, those who are in
education or become disabled are excluded from labour market participation.
Second, a decision is made whether an individual retires from the labour
market. This process is influenced by whether an individual suffers long-term
illness or periods of long-term unemployment late in life and membership of a
private pension plan. A simulation is then carried out on the remaining group
to determine whether they will enter the labour market or not.5 As long
periods out of work will reduce the chances of entering work, duration
variables are included. Likewise, lack of formal childcare support and lone
parenthood in Ireland will have an impact on the decision.
Even when one includes these influences on the decision to work, there is
a great deal of heterogeneity and thus the model is likely to produce too much
career mobility. To partially limit the effect of this, we construct the notion of
those in regular and marginal employment (See Atkinson and Micklewright,
1991). Membership of a pension plan or public sector employment, together
with an individual’s labour market position in the previous period and a
generated measure of permanence6 is used to determine regular/marginal
employment.
If an individual is determined as being in work in a period, the model then
simulates whether that individual becomes an employee or opts for self-
employment. Employees have a choice between two discrete labour supply
states, part-time or full-time work. The self-employed have the choice between
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sions in the past have a strong bearing on their current decision.
The model incorporates in a relatively simple way the influence of the tax-
benefit system on labour market behaviour. Individuals optimise behaviour
based on tax-benefit outcomes when deciding to work or not, when deciding to
work full-time or part-time, when deciding to become self-employed and when
choosing to seek work if out of work.
It would be desirable to simulate a model of savings and consumption
behaviour with wealth accumulation and investment returns. Because of data
problems, we instead however, employ a simpler model where only invest-
ment, property income and consumption are simulated.7 Lastly, taxes and
benefits are simulated using the EUROMOD tax-benefit model (see 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001), which contains detailed rules of the Irish
tax-benefit system together with additional modules for social insurance
benefits. 
A method known as alignment is used to calibrate aggregates simulated
by the model with external control totals. This allows macro-economic
conditions to be incorporated exogenously in the model and thus alignment
contains the forecast assumptions for the simulations.
Validation
In order to validate outcomes simulated by the model, we compare life-
cycle employment rates simulated by the dynamic microsimulation model with
actual employment rates for the population as a whole taken from a cross-
section in the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey. Table 1 describes the employment
rate for individuals with different educational qualifications over the life-
course. When we compare simple average employment rates, we find that
employment rates are much higher for the simulated cohort for each age group
than for the total population in 1994. However when one decomposes by the
employment rates for different educational attainment groups, we find that
employment rates are much closer.8 The upward shift in the overall
employment rates result from the compositional change in the distribution of
education levels in the population. In the last column, we can see the
proportion of the simulated and 1994 populations with different education
levels. We see that while in 1994 only 9(8) per cent of males (females) had
third level education, taking education participation rates of the mid-late
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education. This is due to the large increase in education participation in the
mid–late 1990s on which the simulated transitions are based. This is
especially noticeable for older age groups and for women where this
differential is greatest.9 
Table 1: Employment Rate by Education Level by Age Group





Lower Secondary 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.58 0.49 5.4
Upper Secondary 0.71 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.56 55.2
Third Level 0.89 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.92 39.5
Total 0.76 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.70 100
Females
Lower Secondary 0.26 0.25 0.55 0.41 0.19 5.5
Upper Secondary 0.61 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.47 45.2
Third Level 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.57 49.3
Total 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.50 100
Cross-Section Data 
Males
Lower Secondary 0.60 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.49 72.1
Upper Secondary 0.72 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.40 15.8
Third Level 0.75 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.87 9.0
Total 0.65 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.53 100
Females
Lower Secondary 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.24 0.18 70.4
Upper Secondary 0.67 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.13 21.6
Third Level 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.39 8.0
Total 0.59 0.44 0.38 0.28 0.14 100
Source: Author’s Calculations and Living in Ireland Survey.
Table 1 validates the cross-sectional employment rates for different age
groups. In Table 2 we consider the validity of the longitudinal simulations.
Here we report the distribution of males and females by the number of years
spent out of work between leaving education and entering retirement. We
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highly related to education level. Comparing the simulated cohort with the
actual population, we find that the distribution is quite similar for each
education level to that observed in the population. In the 1994 data, for men
we consider the percentage without any employment gaps in the 55-65 age
group. Older women even when accounting for different education levels have
had much lower employment rates than for younger women. As a result a
lower proportion of the 55-65 age group will have no years out of the labour
market than for younger women. Because we assume that the behaviour of
women is based on an extrapolation of current trends of younger women, it is
more appropriate to compare the outputs of the model against the employment
persistence of younger women. We therefore look at the proportion of women
aged 30-35 who have spent no years out of work as our comparator.
Table 2: Distribution of Years Not Worked by Education Level 
Simulated 1994 Data
01 -9 10-14 15-19 20+ 0
Males
Lower Secondary 44.4 7.4 18.5 22.2 7.4 49.9
Upper Secondary 52.0 7.6 5.7 14.3 20.4 52.0
Third Level 74.5 0.5 7.0 11.0 7.0 74.1
Females
Lower Secondary 11.1 0 3.7 44.4 40.7 10.3
Upper Secondary 35.3 1.8 2.7 11.6 48.7 34.4
Third Level 52.7 0.4 1.6 6.6 38.8 55.4
Source: Author’s Calculations and Living in Ireland Survey 1994.
III MEASUREMENT ISSUES
Income Definitions
The main income concept considered in this paper is disposable income,
which consists of market income net of taxes, social insurance contributions
and benefits. We do not consider here, social insurance contributions paid by
employers. Contributions paid by employees in the public and private sector
and by the self-employed are included in the analysis. Market income is the
sum of employment earnings, self-employment earnings, farm income, income
from a secondary job, investment income, property income and private pension
income. All figures are for 1998. 
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measurement of lifetime income. Because income is preferred earlier in one’s
life than later (interest can be earned on accumulated wealth), it is
commonplace to use a discount rate when comparing incomes at different
points over time. Harding (1993) however abstracts completely from
discounting, arguing that as income growth tends to follow economic growth
rates and because it is reasonable to set discount rates equal to the economic
growth rates, discount rate and growth rates are equal to each other and thus
cancel each other out. In this paper, we make the same assumption. One
problem highlighted by Falkingham and Hills (1995) is that not all income
sources rise at the rate of economic growth. For example, in the UK, benefits
and income tax thresholds tend to increase at the rate of prices rather than
economic growth. Likewise, occupational pensions will tend to rise at a lower
rate than economic growth. However, because the objective is to focus on the
lifetime redistributive effect of a particular system, rather than the long-term
effect of government policy, we continue with Harding’s assumption.10
An issue raised by Layard is the significance of life length. Those with the
same lifetime income but different life lengths, will have different annual
incomes. Annualising lifetime income by dividing by the length of life may
therefore be a better measure of lifetime average welfare. Annualising will
result in individuals with shorter lifetimes tending to have higher annualised
lifetime income. This is because they will have proportionally less of their
lifetimes in retirement. Retirement tends to be a period of lower income and
therefore lower periods in retirement results in a higher proportion of life-
length spent in work. Also having a longer life may result in higher transfers
from the state, through pension payments for a longer period. In Caldwell et
al. (1999), it was found that the longer length of life of those in higher social
classes resulted in a much less progressive tax-benefit system over the
lifetime.
Measuring Redistribution
In this paper the level of redistribution is calculated using measures based on
the Gini coefficient: 




where p is the cumulative population share and LM(p), the Lorenz Curve at
point p. If Lorenz Curve A lies completely inside curve B, then it is possible to
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However, if the Lorenz Curves cross, it is not possible to make inequality
comparisons without using value judgements. 
In order to measure redistribution we use the Reynolds-Smolensky index,
which is defined as the difference between the Gini coefficient for market
income and post-instrument income:
ΠA
RS = GM – GM+A = 2   
1
0
[LM(p) – LM+A(p)] dp  (2)
where M is market income and A are taxes and benefits.
Decomposing Income Inequality by Determinants
We  would like to assess the impact, income determinants such as
education, age, family structure, age at death, lifetime labour market
characteristics have on total inequality of disposable and market income and
thus indirectly their impact on redistribution. Decomposing inequality
measures by population group is highly dependent on sample size and thus,
the use of many sub-categories is often not feasible given data constraints. To
get around this problem, a regression-based method has been introduced to
investigate the contribution made by these factors (See Morduch and Sicular,
1998). The method starts with a decomposition of total income Y,  into a
regression equation as detailed in formula (3). 
Y=  X β + ε (3)
where X is an n × M vector of M attributes described in Table 5 and , an n × 1
vector of residuals, where n is the sample size. The next step involves splitting
for each unit, i, total income into the component Yi
m, accounted for by each
independent variable Xi: 
m=1
Yi =   Yi
m  where Yi
m = Xi
m  βm, for m ≤ M;  Yi
m = εi, for m = M + 1 (4)
m+1
In this way, total income variability can be decomposed into its components
accounted for by these independent attributes as described in (5).
n
  (βm. Xi




i=1 I =   Iρmχm   I.  I  m   where Im = ––––––––––––––––––– (5) n




and where ρm is the correlation between component m and total income and
χm = µm/µ is factor m’s factor share and  µm, µ the mean income for group m
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Gini measure of inequality. However, because it is difficult to decompose the
Gini index, an alternative measure is needed. Also, because of the existence of
zero incomes in the data, it is necessary to employ an inequality index that can
handle these. I2, (σ2/2µ2) is one such index that has the advantage of being
easy to decompose. We must note however, that it gives less weight to poorer
individuals than indices such as the Theil L and T indices.11
IV RESULTS
Lifetime Income
This section summarises the level of lifetime income and the
characteristics that influence it. Table 3 describes the ratio of lifetime
disposable income and its components for males and females. In column (1),
we assume that incomes are not shared between individuals who share
households over the lifetime. We notice that disposable income for males is 1.3
times that for females. For market income the ratio is 1.5. Thus over the
lifetime there is redistribution from men to women. 
Table 3: Ratio of Lifetime Income for Males to Females
(1) (2) (3)
No Sharing Sharing/EqSc Annualised/
Sharing/EqSc
Disposable Income 1.31 1.24 1.31
Market Income 1.46 1.41 1.50
Income Tax 1.43 1.37 1.45
Social Insurance Contribution 1.48 1.48 1.62
Income Levy 1.52 1.48 1.58
Pension Contributions 2.27 2.21 2.42
Social Assistance  0.81 0.87 0.97
Social Insurance  0.65 0.59 0.57
Child Benefit 0.79 0.74 0.76
Source:  Author’s Calculations. Assumption 1: Market income and social insurance
contributions not shared, social benefits shared equally, joint income taxes shared in
proportion to taxable income. No Equivalence Scale used. Assumption 2: All incomes
and components equally shared between adults. 1 (Head), 0.7 (Adult Dependants), 
0.5 (Child Dependents). Equivalence Scale used. Assumption 3: All incomes and
components are annualised and equally shared between adults. 1 (Head), 0.7 (Adult
Dependents), 0.5 (Child Dependents). Equivalence Scale used.
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higher the ratio of taxes and contributions relative to the ratio for market
income, the more the redistribution. For benefits the lower the ratio is, the
more the redistribution from males to females. We see that without sharing
the ratio of income tax of males to females is lower than for market income,
implying a relatively lower tax rate for men compared with their incomes. Part
of the reason for this is that some benefits are also included in the taxbase.
Because females receive more benefits, their taxbase would increase relative
to males and thus the ratio of male and female taxbases would be lower than
for market income. In addition, working men are more likely to have non-
working spouses than working women. As a result of joint taxation, men will
face lower tax rates. While the ratio of employee social insurance contributions
is higher for men it is similar to market income and so there is little redistri-
bution from men to women relative to their market income. Males are however
far more likely to be members of occupational pension schemes and so the ratio
of pension contributions is higher. For each of the benefits, women are more
likely to be recipients than men. The ratio is closer for social assistance than
social insurance benefits. This is because social assistance is more important
during the working life than insurance. Because of higher mortality rates for
men than for women, less men survive during the years of retirement. The
working years are therefore relatively more important for males than females.
Thus even though men have higher insurance benefits per person in retire-
ment, insurance benefits taken over the lifetime are less on average than for
women.
The previous paragraph relates more to the power over resources in
households, than average living standards. This is because there is likely to 
be some degree of sharing within a household. In a cross-section, one can
account for this by pooling income between members of the same unit and
applying an equivalence scale to take account of economies of scale of living
together. However, over time the units do not remain constant. There is
variation in the composition of household units due to partnership formation,
partnership dissolution, death and leaving home and thus there are particular
problems in defining lifetime welfare measures of individuals. To account for
actual living standards faced by individuals when members of multi-
individual households, we assume some degree of sharing of resources within
households and economies of scale. In assumption (2), we assume equal
sharing of resources within the family. We also assume that there are
economies of scale in having more than one person in the household, assuming
an equivalence scale where a value of 1 is given for the first adult, 0.7 for 
other adults and 0.5 for children under 18 and in education. The living
standard of individuals in a household at a point in time is the equivalised
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lifetime welfare level. 
The impact of our assumptions about sharing and economies of scale is
that although men are still on average richer, the ratio of male to female
lifetime disposable and market incomes is closer. The average disposable
income of males is 24 per cent more than females’. However, the ratio of
market income is still higher than the ratio for disposable income, indicating
that the conclusion of a transfer of resources between genders over the lifetime
is robust to assumptions about sharing.
So far we have examined only differences in average lifetime incomes and
have ignored the influence of average life length. In assumption (3) we factor
in the effect of life length by dividing income components by the number of
years individuals were alive. Because women live longer than men, we find
that although using the same income concept as assumption (2), the average
living standard gap for women and men widens.
Table 4 reports the ratio of average incomes for different education levels
to the average of the population for males and females separately. Again we
decompose total lifetime disposable income into its constituent components.
Here we take assumption (3), where life length adjusted income is shared
equally within the household and that 1/0.7/0.5 equivalence scale is used. As
one would expect, for both males and females, the higher educated have higher
disposable incomes than the less well educated. Males, in terms of both
market and disposable income, have a higher premium for university
education relative to the average than for females. However, for females, the
differential of third level and upper secondary is greater. Turning to the
redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system we find that redistribution is
greatest for females. For each education level, the gap between the relative
disposable and market incomes is greater for females than for males.
So far we have considered the relative welfare of men and women and the
effect of educational qualifications. We are also interested in quantifying the
effect of other characteristics on lifetime income and their components. In
order to do this, we employ a regression method, taking the relevant
equivalised market income or disposable income as regressor and various
demographic, human capital and labour market characteristics as explanatory
variables. We do not annualise income in this instance, so that we can
determine the influence of life length on lifetime income. 
Table 5 reports the impact of personal characteristics on lifetime
disposable and market income. The table reports the regression coefficients of
personal characteristics on lifetime market and disposable incomes. We note
that in both cases, signs and relative values of coefficients are similar for the
two income types. Life length and years worked are important positive
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influence with, as expected, employers and managers or professionals, having
the highest income, with non-manual workers having the lowest. The
relationship with education is as expected, with higher education levels as
shown in Table 4 being positively correlated with both market and disposable
income. We also notice that being married has a negative influence on
equivalised income. Although those in work are more likely to marry, as are
those in the relatively higher earning occupations, these characteristics are
likely to be correlated with other factors. Having children, because an
equivalence scale is used, results in a lower standard of living than if the
families did not have children. 
Table 4: Ratio of Lifetime Income for each Education Level Achieved to the
Average by Male and Female1
Male Female
LoSec UpSec Univ2 Total LoSec UpSec Univ2 Total
Disposable Income 57.3 80.4 133.2 100.0 53.5 74.2 128.8 100.0
Market Income 45.0 73.0 145.1 100.0 28.9 62.3 142.5 100.0
Income Tax 35.9 65.6 156.8 100.0 19.1 54.2 151.0 100.0
Social Insurance 
Contributions 51.1 82.2 131.5 100.0 27.0 61.9 143.1 100.0
Income Levy 43.4 70.1 149.4 100.0 20.4 52.3 152.6 100.0
Pension Contributions 37.1 56.3 169.6 100.0 15.0 50.1 155.2 100.0
Social Assistance  195.9 140.4 30.5 100.0 258.5 128.2 56.5 100.0
Social Insurance  67.8 87.7 121.6 100.0 64.9 91.6 111.6 100.0
Child Benefit 157.4 97.9 95.1 100.0 218.3 104.0 83.2 100.0
Source: Author’s Calculations. 
Note 1: Assumption (3) of Table 3 adopted. 
2: LoSec – Lower Secondary, UpSec – Upper Secondary, Univ – Third Level.
Comparing the coefficients between market and disposable income, we can
measure how the influence of different characteristics changes when the
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit is included. Disposable income in this
model is 20 per cent less on average than market income.12As a result, if these
characteristics had the same absolute effect on both types of income, then
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20 per cent. This does not happen. The coefficient on the constant adjusts by
the amount expected, but the relative contribution of the other characteristics
changes. The impact of characteristics such as the labour market, human
capital and gender fall in absolute terms as does the impact of children. All of
these characteristics are important influences on income. The progressive
nature of the tax-benefit system, will result in individuals with characteristics
that positively influence income having their income reduced to a greater
extent. Characteristics that are more likely to have lower incomes, will be
more likely to receive benefits. The coefficients on life length and marriage
increase. The longer an individual lives, the longer they will spend in
retirement and hence the longer they will receive state benefits. Thus
disposable income will increase relative to market income the longer they live.
Table 5: Characteristics that Influence Equivalent Lifetime Income 
Dependent Variable Disposable Market
Life Length 590** 581**
Years Worked 572** 846**
Years Unemployed –102** –189**
Years in Employment 55 177
Years Farming 295** 410**
Years in Part-Time Work –503** –875**
Private Sector –69** –130**
Upper Professional 10,442** 19,612**
Lower Professional 9,231** 17,033**
Employer and Manager 9,116** 15,569**
Salaried Employees –451** –1,744
Intermediate Non-manual –3,475** –5,905**
Other Non-manual –3,155** –6,218**
Skilled Manual 2,258 4,257
Married –7,897** –5,948**
Number of Children –1,938** –2,844**
Upper Secondary Educated 1,258 2,315
University Educated 6,771** 13,524**
Father Upper Secondary Educated –492 –671




Source: Author’s Calculations. 
Note ** – statistically significant at the 95 per cent level.
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In this section we examine the distribution of lifetime income and its
composition. Table 6 describes the distribution of disposable income sub-com-
ponents by quintiles of market income. Incomes are reported as a percentage
of annualised equivalent market income. Annualised income is assumed to be
shared equally between spouses in a family, and with the equivalence scale
described in the previous section. 
Table 6: Components of Annualised Lifetime Disposable Income over the
Income Distribution (As a Percentage of Market Income)1
Market Income Quintile 12 345T otal
Market Income2 5.0 47.8 88.9 132.3 225.5 100.0
Tax-Benefit System 344.6 5.5 –14.1 –23.8 –32.6 –19.3
Income Tax –18.0 –21.2 –23.4 –26.2 –32.2 –27.7
Social Ins. Contrib. –1.8 –2.4 –2.7 –2.6 –2.0 –2.3
Income Levy –0.9 –1.4 –1.8 –1.9 –2.0 –1.9
Pension Contributions –0.7 –1.5 –1.5 –2.6 –2.9 –2.4
Social Assistance Benefits 244.9 12.6 4.2 2.3 1.5 5.7
Social Insurance Benefits 111.0 18.4 10.7 7.1 5.0 9.0
Child Benefits 9.9 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.4
Disposable Income Quintile 12 345T otal
Percentage of Males3 31.2 45.7 55.5 55.3 65.0 50.6
Average Life length3 75.1 73.6 75.9 76.8 79.6 76.2
Source: Author’s Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Assumption 3 of Table (3) is used. 
2. As a percentage of average market income. 
3. Disposable income quintile used.
Income tax is the most important instrument in the tax benefit system. We notice the
progressivity of the income tax system, where income tax as a percentage of market
income rises by market income quintile. 
The next most important instrument in terms of total size is social
insurance benefits. Because eligibility for social insurance benefits depends
upon having a work history, those in higher quintiles, receive on average more
social insurance benefits. However, taken as a percentage of market income
we find that social insurance is quite targeted, where the relative amount falls
with lifetime income. This high degree of targeting is due to the absence of an
earnings related component to the social insurance benefit system. 
The targeting of social insurance benefits is even more well-defined when
we consider social insurance benefits as a proportion of social insurance
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tional across the income distribution. Because the social insurance system is
not self-financing additional transfers are made from general progressive
income taxation. Thus the social insurance system as a whole is quite
redistributive. 
As one would expect, means tested social assistance benefits are also
targeted at the bottom of the income distribution. Although less important,
child benefits too are proportionally more important to people at the bottom of
the income distribution than at the top. 
We also consider some of the characteristics of different individuals across
the income distribution. For this, we utilise annualised equivalent disposable
income quintiles as our ranking variable. We see that women are more likely,
even under the assumption of shared income within a household, to be in the
bottom of the income distribution. While two-thirds of the bottom disposable
income quintile are female, two-thirds of the top quintile are males. Also we
see that even though the quintiles adjust for life length, we see that average
life length increases from quintile 2 to quintile 5. The average life length of
quintile 2 is less than quintile 1 because of the greater reliance on benefits
during retirement.
Lifetime Versus Annual Redistribution
We now compare the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system taking
the lifetime as the accounting period with an annual accounting period. In
order to produce an annual income distribution, we utilise a similar method to
Harding (1993) and Falkingham and Hills (1995). In a steady state, the
distribution of the annual incomes over the lifetime of a single cohort will be
comparable to the distribution of incomes of a cross-section. Therefore, we use
the distribution of annual incomes over the lifetime of our cohort as our
measure of the distribution of annual income.
In Table 7 we consider the variability of disposable and market incomes as
measured by the Gini coefficient and the degree of redistribution as measured
by the Reynolds-Smolensky index (with reranking). As expected, because of
the inequality reducing effect of public policy, disposable income for all income
concepts is less variable than market income. We also see that lifetime
incomes are less variable than annual incomes (market – 0.45 vs. 0.54;
disposable – 0.35 vs. 0.41). This is due to the impact of income mobility over
the life-course. 
Redistribution is higher when measured over a year as compared with a
lifetime (0.13 – 0.10). This is indicative of the importance of intra-personal
redistribution and is consistent with the influence of mobility within the
lifetime that results in individuals who pay taxes at one point and receive
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redistribution of the tax-benefit system is lower when lifetime incomes are
annualised than when lifetime is considered unannualised.
Table 7: Inequality for Various Income Measures (Gini Coefficient)1
Income Definition Market  Disposable 
Income Income Redistribution2
Simulated – Lifetime 0.45 0.35 0.10
Simulated – Lifetime Annualised 0.48 0.40 0.08
Simulated – Annual 0.54 0.41 0.13
Simulated – Annual (94 weights) 0.65 0.44 0.21
1994 Data – Annual (household) 0.54 0.34 0.20
1994 Data – Annual (family) 0.62 0.42 0.20
Source: Author’s Calculations. Notes: For Non-annualised income, Assumption (2) of
Table 3 is used. Otherwise Assumption (3) is used. Note 1. For comparability reasons
we simulate the 1998 tax-benefit system on the 1994 data. 2. Redistribution is
measured by the difference between the Gini for Market income and the Gini for
Disposable income, known as the Reynolds Smolensky Index (with reranking).
As an additional source of validation for the model, we compare the
variability of simulated annual income with the variability of current income
found in the data in 1994.13 While the variability of market incomes is similar
(0.54 – 0.54), disposable incomes are much more variable for the simulated
cohort than for the 1994 household population (0.41 – 0.34). 
The difference between the simulated data and the survey data can be
partially explained by the fact that in the simulated data, individuals are
grouped into a narrower family unit, ignoring other household members. The
survey-based measures meanwhile consider the wider household as the unit of
analysis. As household sizes in Ireland are the largest in the European Union
due to the presence of other non-dependent individuals,14 it is likely to have a
strong effect on the Gini-based measures used here. 
Comparing the variability of incomes in the data when individuals are
grouped into families, we see that the variability of both market and
disposable incomes are higher, with data based disposable income variability
being similar to the simulated variability (0.41 – 0.42). However, the vari-
ability of market income is now quite different (0.54 – 0.62). However, as
highlighted above, the simulated cohort has a very different population to the
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circumstances result in more of the population in work in the simulated cohort
than in the population cross-section. To try to make the simulated cohort more
compatible with the 1994 data, we reweight the simulated cohort so that the
education distribution is the same as that of the 1994 population. When we do
this, we see that the variability of market (0.65 – 0.62) and disposable incomes
(0.44 – 0.42) are broadly comparable in the simulated and survey data.15
In Table 8 we consider the distribution of the components of disposable
income by annual market income quintile. We must note that because there is
no market income in the bottom quintile, we do not report this quintile.
Comparing with Table 6 we can compare the degree of targeting of income
components. The tax-benefit system taken as a whole is more targeted over
the year than the lifetime. Income tax is marginally more progressive over a
year than over the lifetime. 
Table 8: Components of Annual Disposable Income over the Income Distri-
bution (As a Percentage of Market Income)1
Market Income Quintile2 12 345T otal
Market Income3 0.0 15.6 85.4 139.5 259.5 100.0
Tax-Benefit System ∞ 142.5 –16.5 –25.1 –34.1 –19.9
Income Tax ∞ –17.9 –22.3 –25.0 –32.1 –28.0
Social Insurance Contributions ∞ –1.6 –2.4 –2.6 –2.1 –2.3
Income Levy ∞ –0.7 –1.6 –2.0 –2.0 –1.9
Pension Contributions ∞ –1.0 –1.5 –2.2 –2.9 –2.4
Social Assistance  ∞ 48.3 2.8 1.4 1.4 5.6
Social Insurance  ∞ 112.3 7.9 5.1 3.6 8.7
Child Benefit ∞ 3.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.4
Source: Author’s Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Assumption 3 of Table (3) is used. 
2. No Market Income in the bottom quintile and so disposable income
component as a percentage of market income is infinite. 
3. As a percentage of average market income.
Turning to benefits, we find that social assistance benefits are more
targeted over a year than over the lifetime. Social insurance benefits are much
less concentrated over the lifetime distribution than over the annual
distribution. This is the best example of the influence of life-course mobility on
the incidence of benefits. Because individuals are required to have a work
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higher than for individuals who receive assistance benefits. Meanwhile if one
focuses on a snapshot picture of the population as a cross-sectional analysis
does, because benefits are flat rate benefits and less than average income,
these individuals will appear to be in the lower portion of the income
distribution. The converse of this explanation gives the reason for the lack of
difference between cohort and cross-section for assistance benefits.
Decomposition by Personal Characteristics
In the remainder of this section we consider the impact of personal
characteristics on the distribution of lifetime income and the redistribution of
taxes and benefits over the lifetime. Characteristics considered include
Gender, Lifetime Labour Market Experience, Family Composition and Life-
time duration. We use the method due to Morduch and Sicular (1998),
described above to do this. In this part of the discussion we examine non-
annualised incomes as we would like to investigate the influence of life length
on redistribution. 
The regressions reported above in Table 5 have been used as the basis of
this method. Table 9 describes the contribution different categories make to
overall inequality. We notice that for market income, labour market
characteristics such as the number of years worked, the number of years
unemployed and occupation etc. are the most important factors driving the
variability in market income. Human capital is the next most important
characteristic. Family characteristics such as the number of children account
only for about 6 per cent of total variability. 
Table 9: Decomposition of Income Variability into Personal Characteristics (as
a Percentage of Total Variability)
Market Income Disposable Income
Life Length 5.1 5.1
Human Capital 21.5 11.3





We notice that when one examines disposable income we find that labour
market characteristics and human capital have much less of an impact. This
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inequalities. The contribution life length makes to this distribution is
relatively limited at 5 per cent. This percentage remains the same for both
measures. The impact of family on the variability of incomes also falls slightly.
V CONCLUSIONS
This paper assesses the redistributive effect of the Irish tax-benefit system
over the lifetime. In order to generate a synthetic cohort to be used in this
analysis, a dynamic microsimulation model is used. The principal conclusions
are that broadly speaking the tax-benefit system over the lifetime
redistributes from men to women, largely because of the income disparity
between men and women in Ireland. This result is robust to assumptions
about sharing between spouses within the household. 
Overall the system redistributes from rich to poor, but the overall degree
of redistribution over the lifetime is less than when income is based on shorter
accounting periods such as a year. One of the principal reasons for this is
because social insurance benefits are much less redistributive over the lifetime
than at particular points in time. Because they are an insurance benefit, their
object is to act as an income replacement mechanism during periods of low
income. However, because they are dependent on previous income based
contributions, individuals who become eligible for these benefits must have
had sufficient previous contributions and by extension income to be eligible. As
a result, especially for long-term instruments such as state pensions, these
individuals will tend to be wealthier over the lifetime than individuals who do
not meet these eligibility criteria, even though at one point in time when
actually in receipt of these benefits they will be classified as poor. 
In the final section we decomposed the inequality of incomes into the effect
of personal income characteristics. The most significant result was the impact
of the tax-benefit system in reducing the inequality due to the effect labour
market history and human capital have on incomes. 
As a final point, it should be noted that this model is very much a
prototype. At present the sample size because of computing constraints is
confined solely to 1,000 individuals. In the near future with improved access
to computing facilities, it is planned to extend the analysis to increase the
sample size to at least 4,000. The econometric models themselves have,
however, been estimated on relatively poor data, a single wave of a panel with
retrospective information and with strong assumptions made about mobility.
Availability of further waves of the European Community Household Panel
will allow for the dynamics to be improved. For these reasons, the analyses in
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with a dynamic microsimulation model than as definitive analyses in their
own right. It is likely to be the case that as the model is developed the values
obtained may alter.
Because of these near-term shortcomings much of the effort has been
spent in designing a flexible software framework in which the model is
constructed. Although applications currently are quite limited, a primary
objective has been to utilise a flexible design so that further applications can
be exploited in the future such as simulating multiple cohorts to get a
representative picture of the whole population rather than a single cohort. As
an indication of the flexibility of the design, this dynamic modelling
framework has been used to simulate expenditures in each of the European
Union countries within the EUROMOD model (See Baldini et al., 2001). Other
potential future applications include:
• Examining projected future income distributions under different economic
and demographic scenarios.
• Evaluating the future performance of various governmental long-term
programmes such as pensions, health and long-term care and educational
financing. 
• Designing new public policy by simulating the effect of potential reforms
such as changes to education finance and pensions.
• Studying inter-temporal processes and behavioural issues such as wealth
accumulation and the impact of tax-benefit systems on labour market
mobility. 
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